UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (HOUSTON)

. Case No. 20-33948

IN RE: Chapter 11

(Jointly administered)_

FIELDWOOD ENERGY, LLC,

et al., 515 Rusk Street

Houston, TX 77002

Debtors. .

Monday, January 25, 2021

. 8:59 a.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY, FEE AMOUNT \$188, FILED BY CREDITOR LLOG EXPLORATION COMPANY, LLC [683];
MOTION FOR ADEQUATE PROTECTION FILED BY CREDITOR
LLOG EXPLORATION COMPANY, LLC [684]

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARVIN ISGUR (VIA VIDEO CONFERENCE)
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT JUDGE

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I N D E X 1/25/21

DIRECT	CROSS	REDIRECT	RECROSS
52			
76	78		
			ADMITTED
			21 27 50 16 50 16
	52	52	52

ECF 774-19

ECF 784-1

ECF 774-20 through 26

ECF 774-27 through 774-35

ECF 774-36 through 774-37

ECF 774-38 through 774-39

ECF 775-1 through 775-26

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(Proceedings commence at 8:59 a.m.)

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THE COURT: All right. Good morning. We're here in 3 the <u>Fieldwood Energy</u> case. It's 20-33948. Let me get a status 4 report as to where we are from Mr. Goodwine and Mr. Perez.

Mr. Goodwine, I found Mr. Perez's phone number. 6 Could you go ahead and press "five star" on your line so I can find yours as well. I think you pressed it twice. If you could press it just one -- there we go. Thank you. Calling from a different number than usual.

All right, Mr. Perez, Mr. Goodwine. Tell me where we are.

MR. GOODWINE: Good morning, Your Honor.

13 P.J. Goodwine. Can you hear me, Your Honor?

THE COURT: I can. Thank you.

MR. GOODWINE: We do not have an agreement, and I 16 think both parties are prepared to proceed. We did talk on 17∥Friday afternoon about witness and exhibit lists to try to keep 18 \parallel things as organized as possible. But I think that both 19 motions, with the concentration on the adequate (audio 20 interference) this morning.

THE COURT: All right. Let's move ahead.

MR. GOODWINE: Okay. Your Honor, my client, LLOG 23 Exploration, is the movant, so what I was proposing to do is 24 give kind of an opening statement and an argument, and then proceed on to direct examination of Mr. Dane, as appropriate. 1 If you want me to pause before that to hear from the debtor, I'm more than happy to proceed in that regard. The main 3 point --

THE COURT: Yeah. If you want to do an opening 5 statement, let's give them a chance to do an opening statement, 6 and then we'll move into the evidentiary record.

MR. GOODWINE: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

The main point of LLOG's motion practice is to secure adequate protection for its secured claim. The same motion component is an actual appendix to that because the relief requested would require us to go to a third party to seek 12 relief in the escrow of production. From a 30,000-foot view, 13 what we need to be cognizant of is what Fieldwood is ultimately attempting to do. And this became clear, quite frankly, after we filed our motion. Due to their plan filings, they're seeking to abandon their plugging and abandonment obligations in both Green Canyon 157 and Green Canyon 201 to LLOG and to other parties while stripping out from their obligations an overriding royalty interest they have in the exact same 20 contract area.

LLOG was patient through the opening stages of the 22 \parallel bankruptcy, but certainly became concerned as to the ultimate (audio interference) reorganization. And with the collateral that we're specifically talking about today, which is not the mortgage in the underlying override, which we obviously believe

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we have and reserve rights to that. But it's the daily ongoing 2 production and the proceeds therefrom that are our collateral and are presently going to simply fund the bankruptcy case 4 without prospects of ultimate resolution at the end of the day.

At the end of the day -- then the proceeds, just to 6 be clear, so we can talk about it from the correct legal terms, we're talking about cash proceeds received from the sale of produced oil and gas attributable to Fieldwood's overrides on Green Canyon 201, and ultimately the plan is for them to extinguish the underlying override and therefore, you know, under 363, we'll be back arguing about that, I'm sure. between now and then, the only recourse we have is to the 13 production (audio interference) proceeds.

Keep in mind the limited nature of what LLOG is requesting in its motions. We are only seeking to have the 16 production proceeds escrowed pending the claims objection process. We are not seeking that the funds be paid to LLOG at this point. We're taking a very measured and limited approach in order to ensure that the only potential collateral available as the bankruptcy proceeds is the cash collateral associated with the as-extracted collateral from the override.

We're not attempting to recharacterize or even get a court ruling or to weigh in on whether or not P&A is an administrative expense or not, even though the focus of our unpaid claims is P&A. We're not trying to challenge what the

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1 scope of an overriding royalty interest traditionally covers. 2 We understand that they're traditionally non-cost-bearing interest. The request for relief exclusively with LLOG's 4 ability to protect its rights in collateral here just so 5 happens to be as-extracted collateral from an override, which 6 is provided for under the applicable operating agreements and various acknowledgments and rights created under public records filing.

Adequate protection obviously emanates from 363 of 10 \parallel the Bankruptcy Code, specifically 363(e). The focus of the requirement is protection to be provided as a condition to the 12 use of lost property during the bankruptcy case. To establish a prima facie case for lack of adequate protection, the movant, LLOG, must show that it holds a claim secured by a valid, protected lien upon estate property, and that there's a decline in the value of the collateral or a threat associated therewith against which we're precluded from taking action due to the 18 automatic stay.

We believe that all of those factors are met in this case. Once we establish that prima facie showing, then the debtor must show how or why adequate protection is already provided without there being further order of the Court.

Overrides are declining, by their nature, in value. That's particularly true in this case for a few reasons. Number one, the present cash flow associated with the

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1 production associated with the override in this case is solely $2 \parallel$ dependent upon operations of LLOG, as Fieldwood is now nonconsent. And secondly, Fieldwood (audio interference) not take $4 \parallel$ any action under the operating agreement or otherwise due to 5 their non-consent status in order to increase production or to 6 propose activities that would protect or enhance (audio interference).

The oil and gas industry is in a precarious state at the moment, as I think you know. There was -- and we uploaded 10∥this last night, and we'd like the Court to take judicial 11 \parallel notice of it. It was filed as Exhibit 46 by LLOG and it's 12 (audio interference) order by the Acting Secretary of the 13 Department of the Interior, which has basically created a moratorium on the issuance of new drilling permits. So any activity in Green Canyon 201 to sustain or to extend production is presently precluded by the Secretarial order.

And if I may, Your Honor, I think this is the first 18 | hearing I've done since the COVID protocols were put into 19 effect. Do I or Ms. Johnson need to upload the specific document, or are people doing that on their own if I call out the appropriate CM/ECF record?

THE COURT: Oh, that's really up to you. You can 23 either broadcast it, if you wish, or people can look at it on 24 \parallel their own.

MR. GOODWINE: Okay. What I'd like to call your

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1 attention to, Your Honor -- and this will be under Document $2 \parallel 784-1$, which was uploaded last night, which is a Secretarial 3 order issued mid-last week that basically in Paragraph G 4 indicates that there will be a moratorium on issuance of new 5 leases and also permits to drill. And that's important because 6 to sidetrack a well or to develop reserves further, a permit to drill would need to be issued.

Now, I don't want to overstate the argument. always try to keep it in the appropriate perspective --

THE COURT: So, Mr. Goodwine, this is the first time 11 \parallel I've seen this order. My quick glance at it says it transfers 12 the authority from some subordinate positions to senior positions to approve drilling, not that it suspends the 14 authority to approve drilling.

It just says from now on we're not going to do it at a junior level, we're going to do it at a "Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Solicitor, Assistant Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Assistant Secretary, 19 or Assistant Secretary" level.

Are you telling me that -- and I haven't read it carefully. But are you telling me that this actually suspends the authority altogether, or does it simply transfer the individual within the Department who would have the authority 24 to grant the permit?

MR. GOODWINE: For all practical purposes, we believe

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it is an effective moratorium because the people that approve 2 permits within the Bureau of Safety and Environmental $3 \parallel \text{Enforcement}$ are significantly junior to anyone on this list. 4 And they bypass even the Regional Director for BSEE, which is 5 the direct supervisor of those that handle the types of permits 6 we're talking about. And even bypasses that individual's boss, which is the ultimate director of BSEE in Washington, D.C.

So I seriously doubt that anyone on this list -- and most of the ones that have the Assistant Secretary titles do 10 \parallel not deal with offshore Gulf of Mexico operations. So, from a practical standpoint, until this order is listed, I don't think that you're going to see a drilling permit issued within the Gulf of Mexico, which obviously creates some consternation --

THE COURT: And it's a 60-day order. Did y'all have drilling planned in the next 60 days?

MR. GOODWINE: Not to my knowledge, Your Honor. it's an indication not to prove that there will not forevermore 18 be no further activities, but the ability to continue to protect the viability of production in the Gulf of Mexico is called into question, and be an additional reason beyond what we put in our memos and what we'll be talking about today.

THE COURT: All right. And are you moving me to take 23 notice of this memo?

MR. GOODWINE: That is correct, Your Honor. We would 25∥ move that the Court take judicial notice of CM/ECF 784-1.

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THE COURT: Any objection to taking notice of 784-1 1 2 as an action of the United States? 3 MR. PEREZ: No objection, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: All right. 784-1 is actually admitted as 5 a document. That will make it easier that way. 6 (ECF 784-1 admitted into evidence) 7 MR. GOODWINE: Thank you. And so with that, you know, especially as we're talking about what hopefully for the 8 estate and everyone involved is a short-term (audio 9 10 interference) get to a plan confirmation, which is not quaranteed obviously for a lot of different reasons, that it's during this period that we're seeking to have the (audio 13 interference) production proceeds segregated and escrowed so that LLOG's secured claim can be protected as we move through 15 the bankruptcy case. 16 THE COURT: How much is that a month --17 MR. GOODWINE: The last --18 THE COURT: How much is that on a monthly basis, 19∥Mr. Goodwine? Roughly. I don't know if I'm talking \$10,000 or 20 \$10 million, so --MR. GOODWINE: Well, it's between the two. I think 21 22∥ it's about \$50,000. And that is with an appropriate caveat a lawyer gets without direct input from client. And don't want

24 to put Mr. Dane on the spot too much when we go through some

examination. But if he may know from a recipient standpoint,

we may get clarity on it.

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THE COURT: Okay. But in the range of \$50,000 is at least what your opening position would be.

MR. GOODWINE: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. GOODWINE: Okay. And then lastly, Your Honor -just, again, from a global dynamic standpoint, and we're here $8 \parallel$ to talk about the 363 issues, but the ultimate concern by LLOG is also forward thinking, which is if their plan is confirmed, 10 \parallel they plan to take the P&A on these properties and abandon them 11 \parallel to LLOG and others, predecessors, and then take the override 12 and strip it out and deliver it to the lienholders as a part of 13 the ultimate package of what will go with the credit bid and/or 14 the purchase.

Now, from our perspective, it's got to be a part of 16 the purchase, not the credit bid, because the public records do 17 \parallel not reflect any filing by the lenders as to a mortgage or a 18 | security interest against the override or the as-extracted 19 collateral that we're talking about today. So the only lien 20 claimant from LLOG's perspective is LLOG, at the end of the day.

So LLOG asserted through its proof of claim a claim 23 for \$902,490.92, and this specifically relates to unpaid joint interest billings for plugging and abandonment on Green Canyon 25 \parallel 157, which is an expired lease. But it's a part of the same

1 operating agreement that Green Canyon 201 is covered by. $2 \parallel$ two aliquots and depths from those two blocks for what is at stake today are all defined collectively as the contract area 4 under the operating agreement.

So an unpaid expense on Green Canyon 157 would be 6 covered by security interest encumbering whatever property that Fieldwood would have on Green Canyon 201. I'd like to call your attention to LLOG Exhibit L-19, which can be found at CM/ECF 774-19. And this is also at Debtors' Exhibit 12, which CM/ECF 775 (audio interference).

And this is -- Your Honor, again, we'd like you to 12 \parallel take judicial notice of it only. If you want to admit it as 13 you did the prior document, that would be acceptable to us, but we want the Court (audio interference) the fact that LLOG has filed a claim for roughly 20 million total dollars (audio interference) for future P&A work.

The only thing at stake today is the 902,000 secured 18 claim as asserted, and we believe that that demonstrates prima 19 facie evidence of its validity for purposes of today only. sure we'll talk about some offsets that Fieldwood believes they have to it later on in the process, and we'll reserve comment until we get to that point in time. So we'd like the Court to take judicial notice of either -- I don't think it matters --CM/ECF 774-19 or Debtors' Exhibit 12, which is CM/ECF 775-13.

THE COURT: Mr. Perez.

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MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, no objection. We had talked
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 2 \parallel to Mr. Goodwine about basically admitting most of the exhibits,
   so we don't have -- we don't have an issue with that.
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             THE COURT: All right. 774-19 is admitted.
        (ECF 774-19 admitted into evidence)
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             MR. GOODWINE: Okay. We also have, Your Honor, just
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   to I guess complete the record on it -- and I'll let Mr. Perez
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   speak up if he has an objection, but we also have the backup
   joint interest billing statements that have (audio
   interference) that appear at LLOG Exhibits L-27 through L-35,
   which are CM/ECF 774-27 through 35.
             THE COURT: Any objection to 774-27 through 774-35?
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             MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, we do not object as to the
   authenticity of these documents or that they were submitted.
   We do object to whether they're owed. We don't agree that
   that's the amounts owed, but we do agree that these are the
   invoices that were given to us.
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             THE COURT: Is that the basis --
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             MR. PEREZ: But we have no objection --
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             THE COURT: -- on which they're offered,
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   Mr. Goodwine?
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             MR. GOODWINE: I'm sorry, Your Honor?
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             THE COURT: Is that the basis on which you're
24 offering them?
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             MR. GOODWINE: That is correct, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: They're admitted --

MR. PEREZ: We understand --

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Sorry. They're admitted for the purpose THE COURT: of showing that these are invoices delivered by LLOG to debtor, 774-27 to 35, but not for the purpose of showing that the amounts submitted were appropriate, or due and owing.

(ECF 774-27 through 774-35 admitted into evidence)

MR. GOODWINE: Thank you, Your Honor. What I'd like to talk about next -- again, from just an overview perspective, is that one of the reasons (audio interference) was when we got the response from Fieldwood, it seemed to be clear that we were 12 | talking past each other on what UCCs were actually -- that LLOG was relying upon to satisfy its lien -- or the perfection aspect of its lien claim. And so we hit the pause button so we 15 \parallel could make sure that everyone was looking at the same document.

So we have gone through that process and what I want to talk, you know, to a certain extent about is how those --18 the documents of public record create the perfection aspect of 19 LLOG's claim, and then we'll loop back to the underlying grant of a security interest in order to kind of close the loop on the fact that we believe that we have a secured claim that requires adequate protection.

Now, the (audio interference) of UCC filings that are in play can be found at -- in both the debtors' and also LLOG's exhibit list. From LLOG's exhibit list, it would be L-11, and

L-14 through L-18. And I'd like to offer those into evidence $2 \parallel$ as they're all certified copies of records (audio interference) 3 parish public records.

THE COURT: Any objection to the admission of 774-11, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18?

MR. PEREZ: No, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Those are admitted.

(ECF 774-11 and 774-14 through 774-18 admitted into evidence)

MR. GOODWINE: And Your Honor, what we'd like to do is demonstrate that under L-11, which is a UCC originally filed 12 between LLOG and the predecessor to Fieldwood, a company by the 13 name of Davis Offshore, LP, includes within it the actual grant 14 of security interest in Section 5.2.

And so from a roadmap standpoint as to where we may 16 be going, under CM/ECF 774-11, I'm looking specifically at Page 6 of 18. And it's Paragraph 5.2 which is the non-18 operating party grant of a continuing security interest in and 19 \parallel to (audio interference). And we believe this is a grant, that the key for (audio interference) purposes -- again, there's some timing issues in the fifth, that in the -- one, two, three -- third line (audio interference) it captures after acquired title. It says, "Whether now existing or hereafter acquired."

And so it's important when Fieldwood obtained title 25∥ to the override within Green Canyon 201 (audio interference).

In addition, the laundry list of what is covered by the grants, 2 without qualification, says all oil and gas produced, all accounts receivable, and all cash proceeds. Therefore (audio interference) limitation -- and I'm sure you'll hear from 5 Fieldwood -- that this override is outside the scope of what 6 was (audio interference) from a security interest standpoint.

Now, I'm not going to go through --

THE COURT: Actually, for what it's worth, that's not what I read them saying. I read them saying that there was a carveout in the agreement that carved out the ORRI, not that they weren't -- they had some UCC problems, but not that the original UCC wouldn't have covered overrides. But rather that the overrides were later carved out, is what I read them to say.

Is that different than what you read them to say? MR. GOODWINE: It is, and I'm working towards that. I'm just trying to get the record established because we don't 18 have an actual stipulation as to the perfection, et cetera. 19 And if that happens during this actual hearing, that would be, 20 you know, helpful for not only today but future purposes. But I think the L-11 and L-14 through 18, you know, create the perfection aspect, and also L-18 is a continuation statement filed (audio interference) appropriate window to keep it alive through today.

So we'll move on from the perfection issue and (audio

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1 interference) but for the time being we'll assume that we're $2 \parallel$ not going to have an issue with the actual grant of the 3 security interest in the first place or the -- not the 4 perfection, the attachment thereof, and it's -- the argument's $5\parallel$ going to be limited to whether or not the override is captured 6 within that collateral package.

Now, to get to, I think, the issue that you just 8 pulled me to, Your Honor, I think we need to look at Exhibits 13, 14, and 16. So these are going to be LLOG's Exhibits 13, 14, and 16. (Audio interference) through Exhibit 13 first, which is (audio interference) by Fieldwood itself, along with LLOG as operator, in which they -- on Page 2 of 8 -- so this 13 would be under CM/ECF 774-13, Page 2 and 3 of 8 are what we're 14 going to cover.

It basically says that Fieldwood and LLOG, each of 16 which own portions in the contract area, which through other public records filings, which I don't think are in dispute, 18 clearly encompass both Green Canyon 157 and the northeast 19 quarter of 201 where the override is. "In consideration of mutual covenants in the MOA as amended and ratified, " they do "hereby agree to the recitals stated above," and do "hereby, by amending the Attachment 1 thereto, as stated in Exhibit A" --"hereby fully ratify the MOA, as hereby amended."

That MOA was the original MOA filed between the 25 \parallel predecessor to Fieldwood, Davis, and LLOG, which is found at

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LLOG Exhibit (audio interference). So, in other words, 2 Fieldwood stepped into whatever was granted under the 3 memorandum of operating agreement as previously filed by and 4 between LLOG and Davis.

In addition to that, on Page 3 of 8 -- and I'm $6\parallel$ speaking from the ribbon there, the amendment ratification is to be recorded -- and it was; we're looking at a certified copy $8 \parallel --$ in both the Terrebonne Parish records and UCC -- I think we checked both those boxes -- are "providing notice of the mutual liens and security interests now held by the parties to the MOA."

(Audio interference) the fact that Fieldwood (audio 13 interference) a grant of a security interest that includes after-acquired title, which the override is. And we'll look at the operating agreement in (audio interference) that works and 16 plays, but the override is for the exact same aliquots and depths in the northeast quarter of Green Canyon Block 201 that is covered by the operating agreement and these memoranda of 19 operating agreement as filed of public record.

(Audio interference) I'd like to talk about next is a couple of things, and that's where we'll get into, I think, the operating agreement provisions, you know, in play, is the first argument raised by Fieldwood is that (audio interference) itself contains the traditional language that it will not be a 25∥ cost-bearing interest. (Audio interference) it says what it

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says. We agree with that. Almost override says that.

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What I think they're missing is that we're not trying 3 to convert the override into a cost-bearing interest. We're $4 \parallel \text{trying to say the override} -- \text{ and for purposes of today, the}$ 5 as-extracted collateral, our collateral for defaults that may 6 occur, which include the non-payment of P&A prepetition that are \$902,000.

So we're not trying to change the characterization of an override. We're simply trying to say that this override is collateral for an obligation that just so happens to be unpaid P&A --

THE COURT: Well, let me --

MR. GOODWINE: -- and therefore we're --

THE COURT: Let me see if I understand where some of 15∥this confusion might come. You're telling me you have an 16 interest in the oil and gas, but you don't have an interest in the override, a collateral interest in the override contract 18 itself? Is that right?

MR. GOODWINE: (Audio interference) the exact 20 opposite, that --

THE COURT: Show me where --

MR. GOODWINE: -- we have --

THE COURT: Show me where you have -- if you have a 24 collateral interest in the oil and gas, but the override isn't subject to cost bearing, then your collateral interest in the

1 oil and gas may not help you. The question is do you have a $2 \parallel$ collateral interest in the override and whatever it gets. And 3 I haven't yet seen that document.

MR. GOODWINE: That's where I think, Your Honor, if $5\parallel$ we go back to -- we can look at it in a few different places. $6\parallel$ Let's start with -- let's start with the operating agreement itself. Then we'll kind of layer into that. So if we go to LLOG Exhibit 1, which I'll move into evidence now, which I don't think there'll be an objection to --

THE COURT: Any objection to 774-1?

MR. PEREZ: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. It's admitted.

(ECF 774-1 admitted into evidence)

MR. GOODWINE: And specifically Exhibit I thereto, which starts on Page 178. So, for the record and for position, 16 we're talking about Document 774-1. And we're going to start on Page 178 of 185 from the ECF ribbon at the top.

Under this operating agreement, the security rights 19∥provisions happen to be an exhibit as opposed to the body of the agreement. With all of the agreement review you've done over the years, Your Honor, I think you've seen security interest provisions where the operator and non-operator have their security rights, mortgages, in the contract area property 24 in order to ensure that there's a (audio interference) for unpaid, you know, joint interest billings and other

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liabilities. And it traditionally protects the operator, not $2 \parallel$ the non-operator, because that's normally where the obligations are due and owing.

In this instance, like in most, there's a separate $5 \parallel$ mortgage component, which is in Exhibit I, Part A, Subpart (I), and then on Page 179 you get into the security interest aspect, which gets you into the oil and gas, the as-extracted collateral, the proceeds of production, and the accounts, et cetera. The key is that the grant of the mortgage and security interest is (audio interference) contract area, and what the parties own in the contract area.

Now, it's true when -- everything we've looked at so far, and we haven't gotten to the point in time within the time line as to when Fieldwood acquired the actual override, that the contract area was primarily the working interest only of LLOG and Fieldwood in Green Canyon 157 and 201.

Now, in Subpart (ii), which is Page 179 of 185, there 18 \parallel is a -- here there's an after acquired title component that allows the operator -- in this case, LLOG, to acquire a security interest in property that's subject to a security interest, and also on the mortgage side, for what is acquired down the road. And that would include, our argument is, the overriding royalty interest because there have been various 24 opportunities, which we'll talk about in a second, to carve out or to directly discuss the limitations on the scope of the

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1 security interest to not include the overrides, and that has 2 not been done.

And so our argument, in a nutshell, to be very 4 precise on it, is that under Operating Agreement Exhibit I, 5 Part A, Subpart (ii), there is "after acquired title," which 6 allows LLOG security interest to attach to (audio interference) the as-extracted collateral of the override when it was acquired.

THE COURT: Right. Does the ORRI under Louisiana law 10 \parallel constitute an interest in the oil and gas, or is it merely a 11 contractual financing arrangement?

MR. GOODWINE: It's an interest in the oil and gas 13 by, I think, fairly clear black letter law under the civil code 14 and otherwise.

THE COURT: The ORRI itself is an interest in the oil 16 and gas?

MR. GOODWINE: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. GOODWINE: Yeah.

THE COURT: Where would I find that?

MR. GOODWINE: Yes. Going to be in the Mineral 22 \parallel Codes. By the time the hearing is over, we'll have an exact cite for you. But it's going to be Louisiana Revised Statute 31 colon something, which we will find and deliver as a part of 25 the --

THE COURT: Because as I'm looking at this, what 2 you're telling me is it's going to be (ii)(a), right? "All oil and gas produced from the lands or offshore blocks." And 4 you're telling me that --

MR. GOODWINE: Correct.

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THE COURT: -- that the ORRI is an interest in the oil and gas produced?

MR. GOODWINE: We're saying two things. The answer is a definite yes and (audio interference) purposes that we also have the interest in the oil and gas produced and also in -- go down to (c) -- "all cash or other proceeds from the sale 12 of such oil and gas once produced."

And so it's not just the oil and gas. It also then $14 \parallel$ converts itself into the security interest against what is then 15 converted from being molecules and minerals into the (audio interference) paid Fieldwood for such minerals at the end of the day.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GOODWINE: And so that's the argument. We'll get 20 you the Mineral Code cite as we move through the hearing.

In addition to that, Your Honor, the same (audio interference) for what it's worth, is also in LLOG's Exhibit (audio interference) which is the stand-alone unfiled version of the memorandum of operating agreement and financing statement that was originally executed by Davis and LLOG -- and 1 Davis is the predecessor to Fieldwood. And it's -- so, for the $2 \parallel \text{record}$, 774-38. I'm on Page 2 of 11. It's basically (audio interference) same concept (audio interference) in a stand-4 alone fashion that also includes, as we discussed, the 5 hereafter acquired title concept.

And the reason why it's important is that neither Davis nor Fieldwood owned this override until Fieldwood acquired it after they became a working interest partner within the field. Now --

MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, I missed what exhibit number 11 that was. I apologize.

THE COURT: 774-38 is what I wrote down.

MR. GOODWINE: And for the record, we'd like to also just make reference to 39, which is a correction to 38. And all it did was change the exact property description from "Garden Banks 201" to "Green Canyon 201." So at this point, I'd like to offer into evidence 774-38 and 774-39.

THE COURT: Any objections?

MR. PEREZ: No objection, Your Honor.

They're admitted. THE COURT:

(ECF 774-38 and 774-39 admitted into evidence)

MR. GOODWINE: Thank you. Now to lean to Exhibit 2, 23 Your Honor, which is now a Ratification and First Amendment to 24 Operating Agreement, and this is where Fieldwood shows up in 2014 after they acquire Davis's interest in the property. So

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1 this is going to be Document 774-2 from the CM/ECF.

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And on Page 2 of 5, in Paragraph 1, it basically says 3 LLOG Energy and Fieldwood hereby ratify, adopt, and confirm 4 the terms and provisions of the operating agreement, become $5\parallel$ parties to and now bound by the terms and provisions of the 6 operating agreement to the same extent as if they were original signatory parties."

So they're going back to Day 1 from an effectiveness standpoint, and the ratification itself is effective December 12th, 2002, the original date on the operating (audio interference).

In Section 4 -- and if I need to do, you know, chase 13 and define terms, I will, but Paragraph 4 says, "Fieldwood 14 | hereby agree that Farmor's override" -- and that's the override $15\parallel$ we're talking about here. And again, if we need to chase the 16 defined terms, we can. But "Farmor's override is not to be considered a subsequently created" (audio interference) because 18 Fieldwood is misapplying what that concept means from an 19 operating agreement standpoint. And quite frankly, they have gotten the benefit of that provision directly when they went non-consent and created the situation we're in today.

Now, in addition to -- I'll move to -- in case I didn't, I'd like to move to admit 774-2.

THE COURT: Any objections?

MR. PEREZ: No objection, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: 774-2 is admitted.
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        (ECF 774-2 admitted into evidence)
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             THE COURT: When preparing for the hearing, I believe
 ||4|| - | I may have this wrong -- that Fieldwood said that the term
 5 "subsequently created interest," although capitalized in this
   document, isn't defined anywhere. Is that right or do you
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 7 \parallel disagree with that? And I may have my memory wrong.
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             MR. GOODWINE: That is correct, but it's also, I
  think, a fairly well-understood concept. And even though it's
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10 | not defined, the context around it does very specifically
   appear in 19.1, which both parties I'm sure are prepared to
12 talk about today.
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             THE COURT: And let's go back and let me look at 19.1
14 then.
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             MR. GOODWINE: Okay. That would be 774 (audio
16 interference) 132 of 185 (audio interference) wanted to find it
  through the ribbon.
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             THE COURT: You said 132?
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             MR. GOODWINE: Correct. 774 dash (audio
20 interference) --
             THE COURT: I'm there.
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             MR. GOODWINE: Okay. This deals with "Overriding
   Royalties and Burdens on Production." Let me give you the high
   level first, then we'll look at the words.
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             THE COURT: Yeah. Why don't you just hold on and let
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me read this.

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MR. GOODWINE: Okay.

(Pause)

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, please.

MR. GOODWINE: First of all, I think you'll notice 6 that the words "subsequently created override" aren't used in there, but I think we'll all agree that it doesn't have an independent definition anywhere within the agreement. I think we've all scoured for it, and it's not there.

But the concepts in 19.1, before we talk about the 11 exception to the carve-outs that the parties made, specifically agreed to, is probably best explained through an example. And that would be if you, I, and Mr. Perez were three owners under this operating agreement, and I granted an override in favor of Mr. Clifford or Mr. Carlson, and I go non-consent, that subsequently created interest I would remain bound to pay, and the obligation would not pass to you and Mr. Perez as the 18 participating parties when I go non-consent. That's the 19 general application of the concept.

When you look at the treatment of the Davis override, which has nothing to do with our dispute, they're basically saying specifically that we're not going to treat that override that way, such that if I go non-consent in our example, you and Mr. Perez as the participating parties would pick up the 25 \parallel obligation to cover that override.

Now, when we looked previously at Exhibit 2 and saw 2 that Farmor's override is not to be considered a subsequently 3 created interest, it's basically saying it's going to be 4 treated as an exception to the general rule under 19.1. $5\parallel$ that's exactly what happened. We can get into the weeds and the nuances, that Fieldwood, you know, bought the overriding question from Shell. It was also a non-operating working interest owner to the tune of 15 percent, so it was both a recipient and an obligor under the override.

When they went non-consent, LLOG picked up that 11 \parallel 15 percent from an obligation perspective and is now paying 100 percent of the override, not what used to be its 85 percent. So, to be blunt, 19.1 worked for the parties exactly like it was supposed to based upon Section or Paragraph 4 in Exhibit 2.

Now what's my main point? 19.1 has nothing to do with collateral. It has nothing to do with the grant of a 18 security interest. It has nothing to do, to the rights of 19 parties under Exhibit I if they need to take action to protect their interest. It's simply a regulator on who has to pay an override in a non-consent scenario. And so their reference to 22 \parallel the fact that the subsequent created interest creates a viable argument to defeat the attachment of LLOG's security interest 24 to the override, it's just a red herring. It just doesn't 25 match up.

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What I would like to call your attention to is that $2 \parallel 19.1.1$, which does not use the words "subsequently created interest," it just refers more generically to an override subsequently created, at the end of the day in the last two lines, all those overrides -- and this shall override that Fieldwood now owns squarely fits into this -- were "made specifically subject to all the terms and provisions of this agreement and shall be subordinate to the rights of the other parties to this agreement."

Now we don't win or lose because that language is in 19.1.1, but it clearly indicates that when parties create 12 overrides after this agreement is effective, and the shall override was certainly one of those that Fieldwood now owns, that the override interest is going to be subordinate to the other rights of the parties under the agreement, and from LLOG's perspective, that includes their obligation to pay for plugging and abandonment, and that also induces the security interest that we're asserting today.

So -- and Your Honor, we can look at, I think, other places in which the records indicate that LLOG has basically ratified the grant of the security interest, and the key component is the after acquired title, and it's basically dealing with all of their interests within the contract area. And since the override squarely is to the exact same aliquots and depths associated with the Green Canyon Block 201, that the

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1 security interest encompasses the override.

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So with that, Your Honor, I think I've hit the high 3 points, obviously, and we may go through some cross-examination $4 \parallel$ of Mr. Dane in a bit. But do you have any questions about the 5 theory or the argument that allows LLOG to go from being the 6 only remaining working interest owner due to Fieldwood's non-consent, and then at the end of the day having a grant and attachment and a perfection of the security interest against the override? And again, we wouldn't be here arguing if there weren't "after acquired title" within the security interest grant, because that's what's important at the end of the day.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Goodwine.

Mr. Perez, are you going to make your opening or is someone else from your team going to make the opening?

I can't hear you, Mr. Perez.

MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, I'm going to make the opening.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. PEREZ: Would you mind making Erin Choi the 20 presenter?

THE COURT: Of course. All right. Ms. Choi is the 22 presenter.

MR. PEREZ: Thank you, Your Honor. I have a couple $24 \parallel$ of slides that would aid in our argument this morning, Your Honor. And I believe in discussions with Mr. Goodwine we had 1 Exhibits 1 through 25 that he had agreed to admit. I think 2 \parallel they're largely pretty much the same exhibits as he had, except for the plan and disclosure statement.

We did file last night at 778-1 what is basically our $5 \parallel \text{Exhibit 26}$, which is a -- it's similar to one of their 6 exhibits, but it has the amounts that we believe are set-offs. We haven't had a chance to talk to Mr. Goodwine about whether he is okay with that. But at least with respect to Exhibits 1 through 25, we would move for their admission.

THE COURT: Is there any objection to the admission 11 of 775-1 through 775-26, which encompasses 1 to 25?

MR. GOODWINE: No, Your Honor, with the caveat that 13 we were going to loop back at the end and try to get the balance of ours admitted also. The only caveat I'd throw out -- and I'm not trying to play games with it obviously, but if 16 we're going to agree to the admittance of what they filed last night, which I think is more in the form of a demonstrative 18 than it is, quote unquote, "evidence," we would ask for the same treatment of our Exhibit 26, which is something (audio 20 interference) --

THE COURT: So he hasn't offered 26 yet. He's only 22 offered 1 to 25.

MR. GOODWINE: I'm talking about our 26. LLOG's 26. I know, but he's not offering his -- he THE COURT: 25∥ hasn't yet. I think he may in a moment. He's offered 775-1

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1 through 26, which is actually his Exhibits 1 through 25.

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MR. GOODWINE: My apologies. I thought he had picked 3 up what he filed last night.

THE COURT: I did not. So do you have any objection 5 to the ones he filed at 775?

MR. GOODWINE: No. No objection.

THE COURT: 775-1 through 775-26, which are Exhibits 1 through 25, are admitted.

(ECF 775-1 through 775-26 admitted into evidence)

MR. PEREZ: Thank you, Your Honor. So, Your Honor, 11 \parallel we have a few slides to kind of set forth our position, but let 12 me just make a couple of preliminary comments before I get 13 started, in response to Mr. Goodwine.

Number one, I don't believe that they have a grant of 15 this interest in the override. That's basically point number 16 one. Point number two, even if they do have that, I don't think it's properly perfected. And then, Your Honor, we get to 18 \parallel the point of the amount of -- that is owed, and I'll address 19 that.

But Ms. Choi, if you could turn to the first slide, 21 please.

And then, Your Honor, I assume we're handling both 23 motions together, that we're not separating them, so I'll treat 24 them both together. I believe that's the way Mr. Goodwine 25 treated them.

THE COURT: I agree. I think that's what he did.

MR. PEREZ: Okay, Your Honor. So, Your Honor, this slide just asks for what their relief is. And I think $4 \parallel \text{Mr.}$ Goodwine has articulated, so I think we could move to the 5 next slide, please.

So, Your Honor, just to be clear, it's their burden with respect to showing that they have a claim, that it's secured by a validly perfected lien, and that there's a decline in value. In addition -- and that's their burden, both with respect to the motion to lift stay and the motion for adequate protection.

Next slide.

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So, Your Honor, in their brief -- in their reply, I'm sorry -- they clarified that the relief they requested was as to the as-extracted collateral. We don't believe, Your Honor, that there is any mortgage on the override itself, number one. Number two, that attaching a description to the UCC doesn't 18 create a mortgage interest with respect to the collateral.

And then, Your Honor, there are a couple of technical 20 arguments that even if they do have a UCC that covers this, that it is -- that these are actually rents, and that rents have to be -- because of the nature of the override, which was kind of -- it was assigned to LLOG and then assigned back, and 24 that made it a sublease, and therefore that they would have to have an actual mortgage to be perfected with respect to that.

But again, we'll go forward.

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But we should go to the next slide.

Your Honor asked what the definition of an ORRI is, so from the ATP case, which the Court may remember, this was what -- this is what the Fifth Circuit said, an overriding interest is a royalty interest. It's an interest in gas produced free of expenses of production, and moreover it's a real right, albeit non-possessory. So I don't know if that answers the Court's question as to what the definition for an 10 override is.

So, Your Honor, if we go to the next page, this is, I 12 believe, kind of the most important thing. And we need to look at the time line. First of all, there are two leases here. Green Canyon 157, Green Canyon 2000 -- 201. So in 2002, LLOG and Davis entered into an operating agreement, and that 16 operating agreement did grant a security interest, and we'll look at that language in a minute.

In October of 2008, Shell and Marathon -- Shell and 19 Marathon assigned its working interest to LLOG and Davis in the -- and the 2001 agreement is as to the 157, Green Canyon 157 block. In 2008, Shell and Marathon assigned to LLOG and Davis its interest in the 201 block. And at that point, they reserved an override in the 2001 [sic] block.

And so, Your Honor, Exhibit 4 is the farmout pursuant 25∥ to which this happened. Exhibit 5 is the actual assignment of

1 the working interest pursuant to which Marathon and Shell $2 \parallel$ assigned it to LLOG and Davis. And then Exhibit 6 is the assignment of the ORRI back to Shell and Marathon at the time.

So in 2014, Fieldwood acquired Davis's interest, and $5 \parallel \text{Fieldwood}$ and LLOG entered into an operating agreement. So in August of 2014, Fieldwood acquired Davis's 15 percent interest in Block 2005. In December, LLOG and Fieldwood agreed to ratify the operating agreement -- that's the operating agreement that we've been referring to above us from 2002, that 10 was amended to include Lease 201.

That agreement we specifically agree that the ORRI 12 was not to be considered subsequently created interest. And that's important. And so later in 2015, Fieldwood acquired from Shell the assets, and Shell assigned the ORRI, which basically had been carved out in 2014, at that time, and they acquired that in 2015. So after that agreement.

So if you turn to the next page, Your Honor -- I mean 18 Ms. Choi.

So here's what we have. And the top line is the ownership of the working interest in 2000 -- in Field 201, and the ownership of the ORRI. So in 2002, they entered into the operating agreement for Lease 157. In 2008, Marathon and Shell each owned a 50 percent interest in Lease 201. In 2008, they did a farmout to LLOG and Davis. And in 2014, Fieldwood acquired Davis's working interest in 2001 [sic]. So that's

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1 the working interest.

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So at the bottom you see has the ownership of the $3 \parallel \text{ORRI}$. So at the time of the farmout, the ORRI was created. In 4 December of 2014, LLOG and Fieldwood ratified the prior 5 operating agreement that -- to include Green Canyon 201, 6 specifically agreeing that that -- that the ORRI that had been created in favor of Shell and Marathon would be -- would not be 8 considered "subsequently created interest" under 19.1.

And then in 2001 -- in 2015, Shell assigned the 10 \parallel interest, and Marathon still owns the 4.875 interest in it, and 11 Fieldwood has the other interest.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Perez --

MR. PEREZ: If you turn the page --

THE COURT: Just to understand your argument better, 15∥are you telling me that because it is not a "subsequently 16 created interest that it's also not an "after acquired interest," and therefore doesn't come into their security agreement? Or is there another reason it doesn't come into 19 their security agreement?

MR. PEREZ: No. I think that's correct, Your Honor. 21 Because --

THE COURT: Sorry. You said no, you think it's 23 correct. So I don't understand that.

MR. PEREZ: Apologize, Your Honor. I said that we 25∥ believe that because it was not a "subsequently acquired

interest, " and was specifically carved out, that -- and confirmed that it was a cost-free interest, that even if we subsequently acquired it, it would not be part of the collateral grant. There was no grant for that to begin with --

THE COURT: But is that -- is there no grant because 6 it is not a subsequently acquired interest? Meaning that -- or an after acquired interest? Meaning that you are telling me to treat the term "subsequently created" undefined the same as I was treat the term "after acquired"? Or are you telling me 10 something different than --

MR. PEREZ: Yes, Your Honor. Yes, Your Honor. 12∥ That's exactly what I'm saying. Because otherwise, then you would have to read out both 19.1 and 19.1.1 out of the operating agreement as it reacted to the Davis ORRI, not to the one we're talking about.

THE COURT: Right. So hold on a minute. So if there was not the exclusion of subsequently created interests in the 18 agreement, in the ratification, are you telling me they would 19 have otherwise had a valid security interest? In other words, are you challenging that they had a security interest in an after-acquired ORRI, but the reason they don't have one in this one is because of the subsequently created interest provision?

MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, I'm actually saying both things, but for different reasons.

THE COURT: Okay. Divorcing it then from the

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1 subsequently created interest, why does there after-acquired 2 property interest not capture the ORRI? Some independent reason --

MR. PEREZ: Well -- so, Your Honor, there's a couple 5 of them. Number one, because there is no mortgage filing as to 6 the ORRI that we're aware of. And there's no pledge of the ORRI itself. There's a subsequently acquired interest.

So to the extent that you view this as a sublease, if 9 \parallel you will, because they -- we assigned -- Shell assigned it to 10 \parallel LLOG, LLOG assigned it back to Shell -- so if you look at that as a sublease and treat this as rent, under Louisiana law, the UCC doesn't cover rent and there is no pledge of the rents 13 under Louisiana law. So that's one reason, Your Honor.

Second reason, Your Honor, we don't -- to the extent $15\parallel$ these are real property interests or real interests, there is 16 no mortgage that we believe covers these interests. We do have the UCC that has a memorandum attached, and Mr. Goodwine was $18 \parallel$ kind enough to send us the UCCs that were not originally 19 attached to his motion. But again, only to the extent that these are personal (audio interference) and only to the extent that these would be covered as after-acquired property, would there be a -- would there be a lien upon them.

THE COURT: So is it your position that under $24\,\parallel$ Louisiana law, to have a lien on an ORRI, you must have a real 25 property filing?

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MR. PEREZ: For a lien on an ORRI, absolutely, Your 2 Honor. I think that's correct. They don't claim a lien on the ORRI. They only claim a lien -- at least by, you know, their 4 reply, upon the as-extracted collateral.

THE COURT: No, I think Mr. Goodwine's argument is 6 they have a lien on the ORRI itself. Because he says that that is an interest in real property, and therefore their subsequent acquired property provision applies to the ORRI itself.

Because that was the question I asked him, is do you 10 | have a lien on proceeds underlying it, or do you have a lien on the amounts received under the ORRI itself? And he said no, 12 our lien is on the ORRI itself. I thought --

MR. PEREZ: So, Your Honor, if that's the case, then I haven't seen a pledge or a grant of -- there's a real property interest, I haven't seen that there is a mortgage covering this real property interest.

> THE COURT: Right.

MR. PEREZ: With a definition.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. PEREZ: So, Your Honor, the bottom part of this, you know, basically shows we believe that it was specifically excluded in the December agreement -- the amended, and that afterwards, when Shell assigned the ORRI to Fieldwood, that it would not be covered.

So if you turn to the next page, so this is where

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1 Mr. Goodwine seeks to impose his security interest and -- in $2 \parallel$ favor of the operator. And this is -- we're talking about a 3 security interest here. We're not talking about a mortgage. $4 \parallel$ And it's a security interest in all the gas -- oil and gas 5 produced, as well as the cash proceeds therefrom. 6 with respect to Contract Area 157. I don't think that we dispute that. That's Exhibit Number 5.

And then we get into, Your Honor -- on the next slide -- so they specifically -- they talk about carved out interest, 10 and that has to have some meaning, Your Honor. Again, in Exhibit I, carved out from what. And we don't believe that it's just a carveout from going non-consent. It's -- I mean, you have to give it some effect. Otherwise, it wouldn't have any effect that, you know, shall specifically make them inferior to the rights of the parties to this agreement.

So -- but -- and when you go to -- this is the exhibit to the agreement, Exhibit 5. And then when you go back 18 to the operating agreement, when you go back to the actual language, on the next slide, there the 19.1 and 19.1.1, you 20 know, specifically carves it out.

And the way we read this, Your Honor, is we read this 22∥to say in a situation where you have multiple -- where you have multiple working interests that -- and you acquire additional 24 working interests, then your working interests would become a subject to it, to this -- basically to the subsequently

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1 acquired. So there's no question that subsequently acquired.

If you then create -- and the situation -- this is a 3 | little different than the situation in \underline{ATP} . In \underline{ATP} , a working 4 interest was subsequently created, and based on Louisiana oil 5 lien statute, it was cut off because it was a bona fide We don't have that situation here. But I think 6 purchaser. what this is saying is you can't use an override to get out of your obligations under, you know, your working interest. You can't use that to do it. But in this case, they specifically carved out the Davis override which existed, and that was the same thing that was done pursuant to the farmout with Shell.

So next, Your Honor -- so this is all back in 2002. 13 In 2008 -- and if you go to the next page, yeah. You have the farmout with Shell. And so it's important that it was -- the farmout conveyed all of the working interests to LLOG and Davis. And then LLOG and Davis conveyed the work -- the override back to Shell and Marathon and -- pursuant to Exhibit 6. And you know, the ORRI created was free and clear of all costs of exploring, operating, developing, producing, maintaining, in force and effect, and abandoning the contract area and all costs of compression. So it was clear that it was intended to be cost-free.

If you go to the next page, Your Honor, the operating 24 agreement -- the assignment of the operating rights was -expressly required LLOG to reconvey this back and to reconvey

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1 it the way they did, which was cost-free. And this is the $2 \parallel$ terms of the assignment. And sometimes, you know, LLOG and 3 Davis are referred to as J. Bellis, and Shell and Marathon are 4 referred to as -- Troika.

And when you look at -- you go to the next page, in 6 the actual assignment, which is Exhibit 7, Your Honor, it says that that assignment is -- that that assignment was made -- it was not assigned -- the operating rights were not assigned subject to the operating agreement.

So if you go to the next page, Your Honor, there is 11 no -- there was an integration clause which said that there was 12 really -- there were no other agreements and that the ORRI and the conveyances superseded and replaced all other prior agreements, whether written or oral, between the parties.

So in August of 2014 -- if you go to the next page, 16 Your Honor, we -- Fieldwood purchased Davis's 15 percent interest in Green Canyon 201. That's Exhibit 9. And these are 18 the subject lands. Then -- and here, I think, is kind of the important -- this is the important language. In 2014, 20 Fieldwood acquired Davis and Fieldwood and LLOG amended the operating agreement.

So at the time, in Exhibit Number 11, we -- it was amended to include Green Canyon 2001 [sic] lease to the 24 contract area. So this is the first time that the operating agreement in connection with -- in connection with the Green

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Canyon 157 becomes applicable to this. And so in Paragraph 2 2 it adds it.

But in Paragraph 4, they specifically say that the 4 LLOG and Fieldwood ORRI is not to be considered a "subsequently 5 created interest" for purposes of 19.01. So it carves out that $6 \parallel$ from -- continues -- it continues to be a cost-free. Then subsequently, Your Honor, in 2015, after the fact on the next page, Fieldwood acquired the -- all of Shell's interest including the override at the time in July of 2015.

So if you go to the next slide, Your Honor, if we go 11 \parallel to the next slide, the ownership interest, I think, is in --12 the working interest, I think, it's pretty clear, but I think the key aspect of it is that at least as late as December and $14 \parallel --$ of 2014 when the -- when, for the first time, the 2001 -the -- I'm sorry. I keep saying 2001, but I mean 201, the Green Canyon 201 lease was added to the December 2002 operating agreement on Green Canyon 157, they confirmed that it was not a subsequently created interest, and then Fieldwood purchased it 19 later in 2015.

So, Your Honor, if you go to the next slide, you know, we don't believe that they have a valid security interest in it, because by its expressed terms, it would -- you know, basically, it was the intent of the parties that that be excluded. There's certainly plenty of written evidence to that effect, that even if -- even if valid, we -- even if they did

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1 have a -- if they did have a security interest, we don't 2 believe that it's properly perfected based on the documents. 3 And in any event, we don't believe that adequate protection is 4 necessary and appropriate in this circumstance.

THE COURT: Mr. Goodwine, before we proceed with the 6 evidence, I want you to respond to one of the arguments that Mr. Perez makes. He makes this out of the assignment and conveyance of the ORRI and he says that the assignment and conveyance was free and clear of all the costs. But then he points out Subparagraph (vii) of the agreement, (vii) says "there are no further understandings, representations, warranties, or obligations pertaining to the ORRIs, and this conveyance supersedes and replaces any and all prior agreements, whether written or oral, between the parties."

Tell me how your lien interest, however it might come about, wasn't obliterated by that provision.

MR. GOODWINE: Which exhibit is that, Your Honor? THE COURT: It's his 775-8, his Exhibit 6. 19∥ showed me the same one, but I wrote down his number when he was 20 going through it.

MR. GOODWINE: Okay. So it's -- you said Paragraph (vii)?

THE COURT: Well, it starts with "free and clear" language, but then Paragraph (vii) seems to have an integration 25∥ clause that he argues anyway, and I don't understand why he's

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1 not right, eliminates any other agreement pertaining to the ORRIs.

MR. GOODWINE: Well, what I think you need to 4 understand, Your Honor, is that this agreement, or this $5 \parallel$ paragraph, or actually this conveyance and override at the time 6 was between Davis and LLOG, who were bound by the operating agreement as owners of what they call the J. Bellis aspect of 156 (audio interference) 201 --

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. GOODWINE: -- and Shell and Marathon did not --11 were not a party to that agreement. So the original parties 12 could say that there are no other agreements (audio interference) later on and impact a party that so happens to acquire the override on a completely separate transaction. again --

THE COURT: Wait a minute. Well, hold on. agreement is -- your client is a party to the agreement.

MR. GOODWINE: Correct.

THE COURT: So it's bound by this, right?

MR. GOODWINE: Again, Your Honor, the expectation is 21 -- how do I say it? At the time that this was done -- I'm going to just make the assumption or -- for argument's sake, that Fieldwood's a party, even though Davis on it, because Davis is the predecessor to Fieldwood.

So when Fieldwood and LLOG assigned this interest to,

at the time, Shell and Marathon who were basically reserving 2 \parallel the override as they conveyed the interest in the northeast 3 quarter of Green Canyon 201, at the end of the day, that 4 interest was then added to the operating agreement from a 5 working interest perspective only. And so the parties that 6 were the recipient of the overrides at the time were completely non-parties to the operating agreement. There was no connection between the two.

So in 2015 when Fieldwood comes in and in a 10 completely separate transaction, you know, it wasn't they only thing they bought. They bought a few other overrides -- and we 12 | haven't looked at -- it's under seal, but there are, you know, major purchase agreements for Troika and Hickory, which I think are their Exhibits 10 and 11. It's just by coincidence that 15 Fieldwood ends up being an owner at the end of the day.

So Fieldwood wearing its hat as an override owner is not the same as Fieldwood is working interest owner that's $18 \parallel$ created all these obligations under the operating agreement. 19 It's apples and oranges.

THE COURT: So are you agreeing, though, that the assignees under the assignment and conveyance of the ORRI took it free of your previously filed liens on the proceeds?

MR. GOODWINE: You can't answer that question because they were not parties to the operating agreement.

THE COURT: Did they take it free of any lien that

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1 you had on the proceeds? 2 MR. GOODWINE: At the time, because they did -- they 3 weren't under a security arrangement or mortgage at that time. 4 THE COURT: Well, no, but you --5 MR. GOODWINE: And again, Shell --THE COURT: -- had a previous -- you had a previously 6 filed -- I thought you had a previously filed agreement that 8 would've given you a lien on all of the proceeds. 9 MR. GOODWINE: Not until --10 THE COURT: And I just want to be sure that your 11 position is that the assignees under this agreement would not 12 have been subject to any lien you had on the proceeds, or maybe that's not your position. I just want to know do you think they were bound or not bound by any liens on proceeds? 15 MR. GOODWINE: Shell and Marathon were not, because 16 they were not parties to the operating agreement. The lien through after-acquired title came into effect vis-a-vis the 18 override in 2015.

THE COURT: So you agree --

MR. GOODWINE: So this --

THE COURT: -- that the assignees under this agreement did not have -- they took it free of any rights you had in the proceeds?

MR. GOODWINE: As to the override, yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. GOODWINE: At that time.

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THE COURT: I do understand your answer. I'm just trying to get this one step at a time. You've got to acknowledge, this is a pretty confusing issue. So why don't we go ahead with your evidence, in addition to the --

MR. GOODWINE: Okay. Well --

THE COURT: -- documentary evidence that you have. What type of other evidence do you have?

MR. GOODWINE: Well, a couple of issues, some 10 \parallel housekeeping, some in reply to questions you had asked before.

Number one, just I had a note on my screen the entire 12 \parallel time to at the end move to introduce all of our exhibits. I'd 13 like to do that now because in response to something Mr. Perez $14 \parallel$ had said in some of your Q and A, I'm going to refer to a document we haven't referred to yet. So I move to admit, if they weren't previously admitted, L-1 through -- I guess it's L-41, although none of us have talked about the plan or 18 disclosure statement yet.

THE COURT: 774, I've got 1 to 39. I don't see 40 20 and 41 yet. They may be subsequently filed.

MR. GOODWINE: 774-1, I'm looking at and I go through -- 41. 40 and 41 are the debtors' plan and 41 is the disclosure statement.

THE COURT: 774 only has 39 attachments.

MR. GOODWINE: Okay. Then I'll cut it off at 39.

THE COURT: All right. Any objection to 774-1 to 39? MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, with respect to Exhibit 3 Number 3, 774-3, that appears to be, you know, a letter that is prepared by a land title -- I'm not sure I understand the 5 purpose of why it's being admitted, but it's hearsay. Okay. What other ones do you object to? 6 THE COURT: MR. PEREZ: And then, Your Honor, the only other ones $8 \parallel -- I$ don't have any objections to any of the other exhibits, 9 Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. 77 -- to the extent not 11 previously admitted, 774-1 and 2, and 4 through 39, are 12 \parallel admitted. 774-3 may be offered during the course of the

(ECF 774-1 and 774-2 and 774-4 through 774-39 admitted 15 into evidence)

proceedings when you can prove it up.

THE COURT: Let's go ahead and do the rest of the evidence. We'll close the evidence, and then I'm going to let 18 you make closing arguments.

MR. GOODWINE: Okay. Do you want an answer to your question that was posed directly to us on the Mineral Code, or do you want me to save that for --

THE COURT: Whichever way you want to go on that.

MR. GOODWINE: Okay. No, I'd just like to step you 24 through it, and we appreciate what Mr. Perez put on the screen. (Audio interference) perspective, I think that what you need to

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do is step through a couple of different provisions of the 2 Mineral Code.

It's the Louisiana Revised Statute 31:16, which establishes that a mineral lease itself is a mineral right 5 which is "immovable," as we call it, or a "real right."

31:18 is what makes the mineral right an immovable.

31:126 is what pulls you into override land, and 8 pursuant to 31:126, that provides an interest created out of a 9 mineral lessee's interest is dependent on the continual 10 existence of the mineral lease. And under the comments, what 11 you'll find is that they tie that back to overrides which 12 creates the override being an immovable interest, also, which 13 makes it susceptible to mortgage. And so that's the answer to 14 your question.

Also, 31:203 specifically says that mineral rights, 16 pursuant to 126, includes overrides, are also susceptible to 17 mortgage.

Now, we can go through the various places where we 19 believe there's an (audio interference) grant of the security interest -- an underlying mortgage and security interest -actually covers both. We've already plowed the ground on Exhibit 38, but from a public records filing perspective, we'd like to call your attention to Exhibit 4, which also includes 24 the grant language. So both from an underlying override and 25∥ the as-extracted collateral, we believe we have both.

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The reason why we're concentrating today on 2 as-extracted collateral is simply because that's what (audio interference) relief is centered around. We're not asking to 4 take the override. You know, that may happen as a part of the $5 \parallel$ plan process or what happens under (audio interference). From 6 the standpoint of what we wanted to do in a measured way, it was simply targeted to escrowing the proceeds which puts you into security interest land (indiscernible).

So we do have some other comments we'll save for 10∥ closing arguments, but I'd like to call Mike Dane.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Dane, would you raise 12∥your right hand, please, sir. Let me go ahead and get your phone activated, as well. If you'd press "five star."

Good morning, Mr. Dane. Would you raise your right hand, please.

MICHAEL T. DANE, LLOG EXPLORATION COMPANY'S WITNESS, SWORN

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Dane.

Go ahead, please, Mr. Goodwine.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. GOODWINE: 20

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- Good morning, Mr. Dane. Can you please state your name
- and title with Fieldwood Energy Offshore for the record?
- It's Michael T. Dane, Senior Vice President and Chief 23
- Financial Officer of Fieldwood.
- 25 How long have you been active in the oil and gas industry?

- 1 A Since 2006.
- 2 Q Okay. Who did you work for before Fieldwood?
- 3 A Dynamic Offshore Resource.
- 4 Q Anyone before that?
- 5 A SunTrust Robinson Humphrey.
- 6 Q I'm sorry. Can you please repeat that?
- 7 A Sorry. SunTrust Robinson Humphrey.
- 8 Q Okay. Would it be fair to say that during the span of
- 9 time between 2006 and today, your career's been focused on oil
- 10 and gas?
- 11 A That's correct.
- $12 \mid Q$ And what percent of that is offshore oil and gas?
- 13 A Since I've been involved, on the industry side, my -- most
- 14 of my career, since 2008.
- 15 Q Are you familiar with the standard -- or I guess -- strike
- 16 that.
- 17 Are you familiar with the concept of offshore drilling
- 18 operating agreements?
- 19 A Yes, sir.
- 20 Q All right. And you're the spokesperson for Fieldwood
- 21 today. Is that correct?
- 22 A Yes.
- 23 Q And are you, with your job responsibilities, plugged into
- 24 the investment decisions for Fieldwood?
- MR. PEREZ: Object to the form of the question.

Dane - Direct/Goodwine 54 1 Vague. 2 THE COURT: Sustained. 3 BY MR. GOODWINE: 4 Do you participate in the various investment decisions 5 that Fieldwood has made since the beginning of 2020? 6 MR. PEREZ: Same objection, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Sustained. 8 BY MR. GOODWINE: 9 Can you please tell the Court how Fieldwood goes about 10 making decisions whether to consent or non-consent to 11 operations proposed by operators on properties in which 12 Fieldwood is a non-operating working interest owner? 13 MR. PEREZ: Objection to the question, Your Honor. 14 Relevance. 15 THE COURT: How is this relevant to the adequate 16 protection question that you're posing? 17 MR. GOODWINE: At the end of the day, Your Honor, 18 we're going to be talking about their decision to go 19 \parallel non-consent, and I want to make sure that Mr. Dane was plugged 20 into that decision. 21 THE COURT: Sustain the objection. I don't see how 22 \parallel that's relevant to the adequate protection question. 23 BY MR. GOODWINE: 24 Is it true that Fieldwood went non-consent as to 25∥operations on Green Canyon Block 201 in early 2020?

Dane - Direct/Goodwine 55 1 Α Yeah, that's correct. 2 Is it true that companies go non-consent when they do not 3 believe further operations are a good investment? 4 MR. PEREZ: Object to the form of the question. 5 Calls for speculation. 6 THE COURT: Sustained. BY MR. GOODWINE: 7 8 Can you tell me why Fieldwood decided to go non-consent on 9 Green Canyon 201 operations? 10 MR. PEREZ: Objection. Relevance. THE COURT: Overruled. 11 THE WITNESS: We evaluated the economic merits of 12 13 this project and we thought about our capital availability at 14 the time. And between those factors, we determined it was best 15 for Fieldwood to go non-consent. 16 BY MR. GOODWINE: 17 Okay. And by going non-consent, you did not have to 18 participate in the risk of future production. Is that correct? That's correct. 19 A 20 Q (Audio interference). 21 A I think that's partially correct. I mean, joint operating 22∥ agreements have certain back-end rights with respect to 23 non-consent. And so there is the potential to benefit and to 24 have risk, even if it's not immediate.

Understood. But you decided that further participation as

Dane - Direct/Goodwine 56 1 a non-working interest partner in Green Canyon 201 was not $2 \parallel$ worth the risk as the operations were proposed by LLOG. 3 that correct? MR. PEREZ: Object to the question. Misstates his 4 5 testimony. 6 THE COURT: I think that question is asked and 7 answered. You asked him why. He gave multiple reasons. 8 you're focusing only on one of the reasons. I don't think it's a fair way to go about it. 10 BY MR. GOODWINE: Isn't it true that Fieldwood plans to abandon Green 11 Okay. 12 Canyon 157 and the northeast quarter of Green Canyon 201 13 pursuant to the procedures in this bankruptcy? The disclosure statement that we recently filed, it does 14 A 15∥ have -- it currently does have those interests as abandoned 16 properties. 17 Okay. 18 With respect to the working interest. Who will be paying for that plugging and abandonment on 19 0 20 Green Canyon 157 and Green Canyon 201 on a go-forward basis? 21 MR. PEREZ: Object to the question, Your Honor. 22 \parallel Again, I don't know that that's relevant to this -- to the 23 adequate protection question. 24 MR. GOODWINE: If I may, Your Honor, it has

25∥ everything to do with it, because it's --

	Dane - Direct/Goodwine 57
1	THE COURT: Overruled. Overruled.
2	THE WITNESS: If it becomes an abandoned property,
3	then predecessors and co-working interest owners would have to
4	satisfy the financial responsibility for plugging and
5	abandonment.
6	BY MR. GOODWINE:
7	Q Okay. I'd like to call your attention to Debtors' Exhibit
8	6.
9	MR. GOODWINE: Ms. Johnson, can you call that up on
10	the screen?
11	Or Mr. Dane, if you're comfortable being able to call
12	it up, that will work, too.
13	THE COURT: Let me make Ms. Johnson the presenter,
14	and she can pull it up on the screen. She's now the presenter.
15	MR. GOODWINE: Debtors' Exhibit 6. And for the
16	record (audio interference) be 775-8.
17	Apologies, Your Honor. This is the first time we're
18	going through this with your
19	THE COURT: I've told a lot of people that the only
20	thing I've really learned well through COVID is patience with
21	technology, Mr. Goodwine, so we'll take a minute to get there.
22	MR. PEREZ: I think Ms. Johnson must be related to
23	Mr. Carlson.
24	THE COURT: Ms. Johnson, if you'll put that in
25	full-screen mode, it's going to show up a little better.

Dane - Direct/Goodwine 58 (Pause) 1 2 MR. GOODWINE: I think -- and Your Honor, we're only $3 \parallel$ going to talk about one specific portion of this, and it's $4 \parallel$ almost on the screen already. If we scroll, we might be able 5 to --6 THE COURT: All right. 7 MR. GOODWINE: -- (audio interference) issue and move 8 on. 9 BY MR. GOODWINE: 10 Q First of all, Mr. Dane, are you familiar with this 11 document? I believe this is the assignment and conveyance of the 12 A 13 override that we've been discussing. 14**||** Q Yeah, correct. And it is that -- for context, this is the 15∥original assignment between LLOG and Davis in favor of Shell 16 and Marathon Oil. Is that correct? If you look at the first 17 paragraph? 18 A That's -- that's what it appears to be. 19 0 Okay. And then if you look at the third recital or the 20 third "whereas" paragraph. 21 MR. GOODWINE: So, Lindsey, if you can scroll down 22 literally, just like three or four lines. 23 (Pause) 24 THE COURT: Ms. Johnson, I just saw that you had your

25 \parallel hand raised and wanted to speak. Go ahead, please.

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Dane - Direct/Goodwine
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             MS. JOHNSON: Yeah, and I apologize, Judge. I'm just
 1
 2 having some technical difficulties over here making my screen
   -- sharing my screen and making it larger.
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             THE COURT: So I think if you'll just pull the slide
 5\parallel bar down, we'll be able to get to where you want to be.
             MR. GOODWINE: Yeah, can you do that on the right-
 6
   hand side, Lindsey? Just literally slide down the document
 8
   about five lines?
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             MS. JOHNSON: Unfortunately, it just won't let me
10 | grab it.
             MR. GOODWINE: Okay.
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             MS. JOHNSON: I'm going to try again.
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             MR. GOODWINE: We'll come back to it -- to that.
14 BY MR. GOODWINE:
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        And I'll ask the question -- and Mr. Dane, I'm not trying
   to set you up or trick you or anything, but do you see
   literally right at the bottom of the screen, what's on there
18 now, there's a reference to the contract area associated with
19∥this conveyance of overriding royalty interest. Do you see
20 that? It's --
21
             MR. GOODWINE: I'm sorry, Lindsey. Go back up. It
22 was the third "whereas" paragraph, right before the "Now
23 therefore."
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             THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
25 BY MR. GOODWINE:
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Dane - Direct/Goodwine 60 Okay. Is that the same contract area or -- strike that. 1 2 Is the contract area as defined with this conveyance of 3 overriding royalty interest the same northeast quarter of Green Canyon Block 201 that's governed by the operating agreement? 5 The operating agreement --6 MR. PEREZ: Object to the question. Calls for a 7 legal conclusion, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Overruled. 9 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I believe it generally covers 10 that part of the contract area, in addition to other parts. 11 MR. GOODWINE: Okay. Let's see how we do in Round 2, 12 Ms. Johnson. Can we please call up Debtors' Exhibit (audio 13 interference) 6, which I think we're using as a demonstrative. MS. JOHNSON: Debtors' Exhibit 6? 14 15 MR. GOODWINE: 46. Four-six. It's what they 16 uploaded last night. 17 I'm sorry. 26. I'm confusing ours and theirs. 18 MS. JOHNSON: Okay. 19 BY MR. GOODWINE: 20 Mr. Dane, this is the spreadsheet that y'all opened up 21 | last night. We'll see it on the screen in a second. But are 22∥ you familiar with the spreadsheet that your attorneys uploaded last night? 23 24 Α Yes, I am. 25 Okay. And you see that there's an offset that you're

- 1 trying to articulate in the amount of \$229,117.00, and that 2 relates to "ST 59#1 audit exception." Do you see that?
- 3 A Yes, I do.
- 4 Q Does ST -- what does "ST 59" stand for?
- 5 A It does sound familiar.
- Q Does that have anything to do with these Green Canyon properties or the operating agreement in question?
- 8 A No, it doesn't.
- 9 Q Has Fieldwood actually submitted itself an audit exception to LLOG or was it asserted by Fieldwood's predecessors?
- 11 A There is a long history of communication that Fieldwood 12 submitted directly to LLOG on this issue.
- Q And do you know whether or not the predecessor of Fieldwood actually asserted an audit claim prior to its assignment of South Timbalier 59 to Fieldwood?
- A I'm aware that, like I mentioned, there is a long history of communication, both with Apache, the predecessor I believe you're referring to, and Fieldwood on this particular audit exception.
- Q Okay. Let me ask the question again, because I'm looking for as clear of a direct answer as possible. Are you aware that the predecessor, Apache, to Fieldwood and South Timbalier
- 59, asserted an audit claim consistent with the offset you're
- 24 looking for here?
- 25 A I'm not aware if they did or did not. No, I'm not aware.

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Okay. Is that then also true that you're not aware of 2 whether or not Apache had affirmatively compromised this claim for the benefit of LLOG?

As I mentioned, I know there was a long history of $5 \parallel$ communication on this issue, and I know that there was various $6\parallel$ claims asserted at the beginning of the process, and that those opinions changed over time as the parties understood what their actual economic interest in this particular issue was.

So I apologize for not being more clear, but this was a --10 \parallel this was an issue that dates back many, many years that was unresolved.

- 12 Q Wholly understood. But you can confirm that Fieldwood 13 itself has not asserted an audit claim in favor -- or excuse 14 \parallel me, an audit claim against the operator LLOG. Is that correct?
- 15 Α Fieldwood has -- has provided an audit exception here.
- 16 Okay. Do you know when that was provided?
- 17 That would go back to 2013/'14.
- 18 Q When did Fieldwood acquire South Timbalier 59?
- It would have acquired that interest in the 2013 19 A 20 acquisition from Apache.
- Okay. Is production from Green Canyon 157 and Green 21
- 22 \parallel Canyon 201 covered by the production handling agreement?
- Yes, I believe it is. 23
- Okay. Can you explain -- is it the J. Bellis Production 24
- 25 | Handling Agreement?

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- 1 A Yes, I believe that's correct.
- $2 \parallel Q$ Okay. Can you explain the relationship between that
- 3 J. Bellis Production Handling Agreement and the operating
- 4 agreement -- and before Mr. Perez objects to that being
- 5 confusing, all I'm trying to do is to get you to explain to the
- 6 Court how production is processed and handled off-site under a
- 7 separate contract from the operating agreement.
- 8 A You're asking -- sorry. You mind clarifying? You're
- 9 asking for the relationship between those agreements?
- 10 Q Is production from Green Canyon 157 and 201 processed on a
- 11 third-party platform?
- 12 A I believe so.
- 13 Q Okay. And that is covered by the J. Bellis Production
- 14 Handling Agreement. Is that correct?
- 15 A Correct.
- $16 \parallel Q$ And under the operating agreement which is Exhibit 1 --
- 17 MR. GOODWINE: So 774-1, if we can call that up,
- 18 Ms. Johnson.
- 19 BY MR. GOODWINE:
- $20 \parallel Q$ So Exhibit C, I just want you to identify it before we
- 21 | jump into the specifics. But Exhibit C starts on Page 159.
- 22 Are you familiar with Exhibit C and COPAS?
- 23 A No. No, I'm not. I'm familiar with COPAS generally. I
- 24 haven't read this as part of the operating agreement.
- 25 Q Okay. Are the COPAS provisions fairly standard in



- 1 accounting procedures for oil and gas offshore operating 2 agreements?
- 3 A That is -- COPAS is generally the baseline that most 4 agreements start with.
- 5 Q Okay. And does COPAS include an overhead component?
- A For certain charges, COPAS usually includes an overhead component, but there are many specific excluded charges that overhead is specifically disallowed.
- 9 Q Generally, overhead is an issue addressed by the COPAS
 10 attachment to offshore operating agreements, including the one
 11 in dispute here, correct?
- 12 A With respect to specific charges, overhead is something 13 that COPAS contemplates.
- Q Okay. And on your Exhibit 26, which is Docket 782-1, you have a couple of suggested offsets for the PHA fees associated with that J. Bellis PHA. Is that correct?
- 17 A That's correct.
- 18 Q Do you know when you first raised those as potential offsets with LLOG?
- 20 A I'm not aware.
- 21 Q I'm going to go LLOG Exhibit 2. (Audio interference) Page
- 22 3 (audio interference) Mr. Dane to confirm that LLOG is a
- 23 partner to this Ratification and First Amendment to Operating
- 24 Agreement.
- 25 A That is correct.

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Okay. And when Fieldwood came in and ratified this 2 agreement pursuant to Paragraph (audio interference) -- which 3 is the previous page, Ms. Johnson -- they ratified it as if $4 \parallel$ they were original signatory parties thereto. Is that correct? MR. PEREZ: Object to the form of the question. Asks 6 for a legal conclusion.

THE COURT: Sustained.

8 BY MR. GOODWINE:

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- Could you read the Paragraph 1 on Page 2 for the Court, 10 please.
- "LLOG Energy and Fieldwood hereby ratify, adopt, and confirm the terms and provisions of the OA and become parties to and are now bound by the terms and provisions of the OA to the same terms as if they were original signatory parties to the OA. Fieldwood further confirms that it hereby replaces Davis as a 16 party to the OA."
- 18 Q Okay. And if you go back to Page 1, if you can confirm 19 for all of us, please, what the effective date is in the 20 opening lines of the agreement.
- Dated effective December 12, 2002. 21
- 22 Okay. So the agreements by Fieldwood go all the way back and are bound -- binding on Fieldwood from 2002 forward. 24 that correct?
- 25 I'm not -- I don't know the answer to that question.

Dane - Direct/Goodwine 66 1 document says that it's dated effective December 12th. 2 | Q Okay. I'd like to call your attention to LLOG Exhibit 38. 3 Are you familiar with this document? No, I'm not familiar with this document. 4 5 Okay. Let's go to Exhibit 13, please. This is LLOG 6 Exhibit 13. 7 MR. GOODWINE: I'd like to go to Page 2, Ms. Johnson. 8 And if you can blow it up, please. I think everyone may have a 9 hard time seeing -- okay. So Page 2, the "now therefore" 10 paragraph. 11 Actually, I apologize. If you can scroll up to the 12 introductory paragraph, please. 13 BY MR. GOODWINE: Do you see a reference in the defined term "Memorandum of 14 0 15∥ Operating Agreement and Financing Statement" defined as "MOA" 16 in that first paragraph? 17 Α Yes, I do. 18 Q And you can confirm that that was actually filed on public 19 record in Terrebonne Parish and in the UCC records. Is that 20 correct? MR. PEREZ: I object to the form of the question, 21 22 \parallel Your Honor. I think the document speaks for itself. And I 23 don't know if he has any independent knowledge as to whether it 24 was filed or not. 25 THE COURT: Sustained.

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1 MR. GOODWINE: Okay. Please scroll down,

2 Ms. Johnson, to the "now therefore" paragraph.

3 BY MR. GOODWINE:

- Q Can you please read that; then I'll ask you a question about it, Mr. Dane.
- A "Now therefore, the undersigned, each of which has an interest in portions of the contract area, in consideration for the mutual covenants in the MOA, as amended and ratified, does hereby agree to the recitals stated above and does hereby, by amending the Attachment 1 thereto, as stated in Exhibit A
- 11 hereto, and does hereby fully ratify the MOA, as hereby
- 12 amended."
- Q Okay. Based upon your position as a senior executive with
- 14 Fieldwood, do you believe that that makes Fieldwood bound by
- 15 what's defined as the MOA filed on public record previously by
- 16 Davis and LLOG?
- MR. PEREZ: Object to the question, Your Honor.
- 18 Calls for a legal conclusion.
- 19 THE COURT: Sustained.
- 20 BY MR. GOODWINE:
- 21 Q I'd like to call your attention to Page 3.
- 22 MR. GOODWINE: So one more Page, Lindsey.
- 23 BY MR. GOODWINE:
- 24 Q And you previously confirmed that Fieldwood has signed
- 25 this agreement. Is that correct?



Dane - Direct/Goodwine 68 I don't recall. 1 Α 2 Q Okay. I don't recall if --3 A 4 Q My apologies for speaking over you. Can you confirm that 5 | -- tell me who John Smith is. John Smith is our Senior Vice President of Land and 6 A 7 Business Development. 8 0 Okay. Is he authorized to sign -- to execute documents such as this that end up being filed on public record? 10 Yes, sir. Okay. So based upon this being a certified copy of a 11 12 public records filing, you would agree with me, would you not, 13 that John Smith signed this on behalf of Fieldwood Energy LLC 14 -- excuse me, Fieldwood Energy Offshore LLC. 15 MR. PEREZ: Again, Your Honor, I think it -- I'm not 16 sure what -- the document is in evidence and it kind of speaks for itself. I'm not sure what this is intended to do. 18 MR. GOODWINE: I --19 MR. PEREZ: And it calls for a legal conclusion. 20 THE COURT: I'm going to overrule. I think it's a routine, you know, "did he have the authority to bind you" kind of question. I'm going to allow it. 22 MR. GOODWINE: (Audio interference) 23 24 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Can you --25 MR. GOODWINE: Yeah, and I'll try to streamline it.

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1 BY MR. GOODWINE:

Q Did John Smith execute this agreement on behalf of Fieldwood Energy Offshore LLC, and bound the company in conjunction therewith?

MR. PEREZ: Same objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm going to sustain, given the addition of the last six words to the question.

MR. GOODWINE: Okay. Then I'll go back.

9 BY MR. GOODWINE:

- 10 Q Was this document executed by John Smith on behalf of
- 11 Fieldwood Energy Offshore LLC?
- 12 A Yes, sir, it is -- I believe -- it appears that way.
- 13 Q Okay.

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- 14 MR. GOODWINE: And if you scroll up, Lindsey, to Page
- 15 \mid 3 of 8, the last sentence.
- 16 BY MR. GOODWINE:
- 17 Q Is there an acknowledgment by Fieldwood that they're bound
- 18 by the mutual liens and security interests as previously
- 19 confirmed under the memorandum of operating agreement?
- MR. PEREZ: Again, Your Honor, calls for a legal
- 21 conclusion. I think the document speaks for itself.
- 22 THE COURT: Sustained, given the wording of it -- of
- 23 the question.
- 24 BY MR. GOODWINE:
- 25 $\mathbb Q$ We're going to move on to the operating agreement, so LLOG

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Dane - Direct/Goodwine
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 1 Exhibit 1.
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             THE COURT: Tell you what. Mr. Goodwine, I have an
 3 \parallel 11 o'clock hearing. I didn't realize we would be here quite
 4 this long.
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             MR. GOODWINE: Okay.
             THE COURT: How much longer do you need with
 6
  Mr. Dane?
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             MR. GOODWINE: Not long. Five minutes.
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             THE COURT: And then who's going to be your next
10 witness?
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             MR. GOODWINE: There are no other witnesses.
             THE COURT: And how long are you going to need with
12
13 Mr. Dane, Mr. Perez?
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             MR. PEREZ: Fifteen minutes, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: Okay. We'll come back at 11:20. I do
15
16 have a hard stop at noon, but we can come back then at 1:30, if
17 we need to. Or if y'all prefer, we'll just come back at 1:30.
18 What would y'all like to do?
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             MR. GOODWINE: I think we can wrap it up before noon.
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             THE COURT: See y'all at 11:20. Thank you.
             MR. PEREZ: Thank you.
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        (Recess taken at 10:54 a.m.)
        (Proceedings resumed at 11:19 a.m.)
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             THE COURT: All right, Mr. Dane. You remain under
25 oath.
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Dane - Direct/Goodwine
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             Mr. Goodwine.
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             MR. GOODWINE: Am I coming through loud and clear?
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             THE COURT: You are, Mr. Goodwine.
             MR. GOODWINE: Okay.
 4
 5
                     DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED
 6 BY MR. GOODWINE:
 7
       Mr. Dane, where -- okay, there you are. I'd like to call
 8 your attention to Exhibit 1, which is the operating agreement,
 9 and go to Section 19.1, which I think we all now know is on
10 Page 132.
11
             MR. GOODWINE: Ms. Johnson, if you can call that up,
12 please.
13
             MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I think I may have lost the
14 -- my "presenter" privileges, if you wouldn't mind giving those
15 back to me.
16
             THE COURT: Oh, sorry. I don't know what happened to
17 that, but they are back to you now. Thank you.
18
             MS. JOHNSON: Thank you.
19
      (Pause)
             MR. GOODWINE: That's our super secret case that --
20
21 I'm sure I haven't read.
22
             Okay. Page 132, please, Ms. Johnson.
23 BY MR. GOODWINE:
24 Q
        Okay. Mr. Dane, you were paying attention when we went
25 through this article before. Is that correct?
```

- 1 A Yes.
- 2 Q Okay. You testified before that Fieldwood has gone non-
- 3 consent on operations in Green Canyon Block 201. Is that
- 4 correct?
- 5 A Correct.
- 6 Q And is Fieldwood now receiving 100 percent of the override
- 7 proceeds as originally assigned to Shell? Obviously not the
- 8 Marathon portion, but the Shell portion that were conveyed by
- 9 Davis and LLOG previously?
- 10 A Yes. Fieldwood's -- Fieldwood's receiving the benefit of
- 11 the override.
- 12 Q Okay. Before Fieldwood went non-consent, was it only
- 13 receiving an 85 percent share?
- 14 A To my knowledge, I believe before we went non-consent we
- 15∥ had a working interest, which was a 15 percent share, and we
- 16 also owned an override, and we got the benefit and the burden
- 17 of each of those together -- or separately, but both of them.
- 18 Q Okay. So if you were a 15 percent working interest owner,
- 19 that would equate to -- based upon how you set it, an 85
- 20 percent receipt of the override production. Is that correct?
- 21 A I don't follow that statement.
- 22 Q Okay. In other words, Fieldwood purchased an override
- 23 from Shell. Is that correct?
- 24 A Correct.
- 25 Q And Fieldwood was a 15 percent obligor of that override.



Dane - Direct/Goodwine

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1 Is that correct?

- 2 A Correct.
- Q Okay. Presently, is Fieldwood receiving 85 percent or 100 percent of the proceeds of the override?
- 5 A Fieldwood is receiving the amount that the override 6 specifies in the conveyance. And I don't understand your 7 question about the 85 percent or 15 percent. The percentage 8 (audio interference) with the override, irrespective of our 9 working interest.
- Q Okay. But Fieldwood itself is not contributing any portion to the payment of that override after the non-consent.
- 12 Is that correct?
- MR. PEREZ: Object to the form of the question.
- 14 Vaque.
- 15 THE COURT: Sustained.
- MR. GOODWINE: Okay.
- 17 BY MR. GOODWINE:
- 18 Q Is it true that Fieldwood is receiving 100 percent of the override as originally assigned to Shell by Davis and LLOG
- 20 previously?
- 21 A Fieldwood's receiving the percentage of the actual
- 22 override, in its full amount.
- 23 Q As articulated in the original override. Is that correct?
- 24 A Correct.
- 25 Q Prior to going non-consent, did Fieldwood bear 15 percent

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Dane - Direct/Goodwine
                                                                 74
 1 of the payment obligation under that portion of the override to
 2 Shell?
 3
             MR. PEREZ: Object to the form of the question, Your
 4 Honor.
 5
             THE COURT: Sustained.
             MR. PEREZ: I don't --
 6
 7
             THE COURT: Sustained.
 8
             MR. GOODWINE: I'm sorry, Judge. Did you rule?
 9
             THE COURT: I sustained the objection.
             MR. GOODWINE: We'll move on.
10
11 BY MR. GOODWINE:
        If I could call your attention to LLOG Exhibit 46, which
13 is at 784-1. Are you familiar with this document, Mr. Dane?
14 A Yes, I am.
15 \parallel Q Okay. Is this good news for the oil and gas industry
16 offshore?
17
             MR. PEREZ: Object to the form of the question, Your
18 Honor, as vague.
19
             THE COURT: Sustained.
20
             MR. GOODWINE: Okay.
21 BY MR. GOODWINE:
22∥Q Has Fieldwood analyzed the impacts of this Secretarial
23 order?
24
             MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, relevance.
25
             THE COURT: Overruled.
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Dane - Direct/Goodwine
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             THE WITNESS: Yes, we have.
 1
 2 BY MR. GOODWINE:
 3
        Okay. And what's your conclusion?
 4
        My conclusion is that this document has a number of points
  in it that are problematic, but it's very ambiguous and vague,
 5
 6 and I think the entire industry in general is looking to get
   more clarity on what exactly the effect of this document is.
 8
   Q
        Okay.
 9
             MR. GOODWINE: Tender the witness, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: I just -- I couldn't hear you,
10
11 Mr. Goodwine.
12
             MR. GOODWINE: Tender the witness, Your Honor.
13
             THE COURT: Thank you.
14
             Mr. Perez.
15
             MR. GOODWINE: I'm sorry, Your Honor, with one
16 caveat. We obviously called Mr. Dane. We would like to
   reserve the right to cross-examine briefly depending on the
18 scope of the direct examination by Mr. Perez.
19
             THE COURT: You're passing him as to all of your
20 direct examination.
                        Is that right?
21
             MR. GOODWINE: As to all of his -- correct.
22
             THE COURT: Yeah. Thank you.
             Mr. Perez, do you have any questions for Mr. Dane?
23
24
             MR. PEREZ: Yes, Your Honor. I just -- yes, I just
25\parallel have a few questions.
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Dane - Direct/Perez 76 MICHAEL T. DANE, DEBTORS' WITNESS, PREVIOUSLY SWORN 1 2 DIRECT-EXAMINATION 3 BY MR. PEREZ: 4 Mr. Dane, do you believe -- does Fieldwood believe that it 5 owes LLOG \$900,000? No, we dispute that amount. 6 A 7 And as it relates to the amounts that are in dispute, how 8 much is that? 9 The amount that we believe that is an actual undisputed $10 \parallel$ amount, subject to it being prepetition and how it would be 11 \parallel treated by our plan, and in these agreements, is closer to 12 \$257,000. 13 Okay. Now, are you familiar with the override that we've 14 been discussing? 15 A Yes, I am. All right. And has Fieldwood ever paid any costs of 16 $17 \parallel \text{production or any other cost related to that override?}$ 18 A No. The override is meant to be cost-free, as is typical 19 with overrides, and so we have not.

- 20 Q And why do you say that? Why do you believe that?
- 21 A The conveyance and assignment document itself that
- 22 establishes the terms of the override specifically exclude any
- 23 costs being attributable to the override itself.
- 24 Q Now, if the stay were to be lifted and the first purchaser
- 25 be put on notice, would that create a hardship for Fieldwood?

Dane - Direct/Perez

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We're -- right now we're in the middle of our $2 \parallel \text{restructuring}$. It's an important -- we're at a pretty critical juncture in our restructuring. We are trying to progress it by 4 getting our disclosure statement approved, ultimately getting 5 our plan confirmed over the next several months. So this is 6 taking up a good bit of time.

In addition to that, it's started having a liquidity impact on the company, which would be detrimental. Liquidity is very important to the company right now. And I believe we'd 10∥probably have to continue litigating this issue, which would cause a distraction to us and our counsel and advisors.

- And just by way of background, how many trade agreements has the company entered into as of today?
- I believe we've entered into around 150 trade agreements.
- MR. GOODWINE: Objection, Your Honor. Objection. 16 Relevance.
 - THE COURT: How is that relevant?
- MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, just in terms of the demands 19 on management, then the fact that they've been negotiating with 20 other parties. Balance of the harms.
 - THE COURT: Is your objection, Mr. Goodwine, that it isn't relevant to anything we have to consider today, or that it isn't relevant to the scope of what you asked questions about?
 - MR. GOODWINE: No, it's just not relevant to anything

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Dane - Cross/Goodwine
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 1 today. But my calling Mr. Dane, I think we called him as a --
 2 \parallel \text{kind of an out-of-order hostile witness, where this is more}
 3 akin to direct examination. So --
             THE COURT: Yeah, that's my question is are you
 4
 5\parallel objecting to it as part of their direct, or are you objecting
 6 to it as part of their cross?
             MR. GOODWINE: Part of their direct.
 7
 8
             THE COURT: I'm going to overrule then. I think it
 9
   is relevant to their direct. It's not relevant to their cross.
  And I'll accept the answer as given.
11
             MR. PEREZ: Your Honor, I don't think I have any
12 further questions.
13
             THE COURT: Thank you.
14
             Mr. Goodwine, any cross?
15
             MR. GOODWINE: Two quick questions, I believe.
16
                           CROSS-EXAMINATION
   BY MR. GOODWINE:
18 Q
        Number one, Mr. Dane. In your experience in the oil and
19∥ gas industries, have you seen overriding royalty interest
20 provided as collateral for loans or other obligations?
21
   Α
        Yes.
22
        Okay. Does that automatically make them cost-bearing
23 instruments?
24 A
       No, it does not.
25 Q
        Okay.
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MR. GOODWINE: No further questions, Your Honor.
 1
 2
             THE COURT: Thank you.
 3
        (Witness excused)
 4
             THE COURT: Any further evidence --
 5
             MR. GOODWINE: We have some --
             THE COURT: Any further evidence by any party? Both
 6
 7
   sides --
 8
             MR. GOODWINE: Not from LLOG as to --
 9
             THE COURT: Sorry. Go ahead.
             MR. GOODWINE: Not from LLOG as (audio interference).
10
             THE COURT: Mr. Perez.
11
             MR. PEREZ: No. Nothing further, Your Honor.
12
13 rest.
             THE COURT: Anyone else have any evidence with
14
15 respect to today's proceeding?
             All right. Mr. Goodwine, unless it's in the
16
17\parallel exhibits, I didn't hear any oral testimony that would meet your
18 Timbers of Inwood Forest burden with respect to showing that
19 what we have is collateral of diminishing value, such that
20 diminishment would impair your client's rights.
21
             Is that in the evidentiary record somewhere that I
22 missed?
23
             MR. GOODWINE: Your Honor, I think by their very
24 nature, overriding royalty interest in oil and gas are
25∥ depleting in nature. And especially with the headwinds that
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you've taken a degree of judicial notice on through the 2 Secretarial order, that the ability to have the requisite comfort level that the production is going to be sufficient to cover the claim is a very big open question.

In addition to that, the current plan is to assign the override to a third party --

THE COURT: Yeah, I'm not worried about --

MR. GOODWINE: -- and through the plan --

THE COURT: I'm not worried about the -- I don't understand how a plan not yet approved goes towards a <u>Timbers</u> of Inwood Forest issue.

MR. GOODWINE: I understand. Then what -- the 13 argument I will make for you, Your Honor, at the end of the day, is that due to the declining nature of oil and gas in general, especially now with the Secretarial order, admittedly 16 when we filed these motions that order wasn't out there, but we also didn't have a plan on file. And our biggest concern at 18 that point was that we were just going to be going on without 19∥any clear quidance as to when we'd be able to analyze things 20 from a plan of reorganization.

But the balance of the harms for approximately 22∥ \$50,000 a month we think is appropriate to set aside to cover what we believe is clearly a fully secured claim to 902. And 24 at the end of the day, that's the best argument we can put 25∥ forward to you.

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THE COURT: Thank you. I'm going to assume without $2 \parallel$ finding every other factor and find that the movant has failed 3 to demonstrate an absence of adequate protection, even if it 4 has a collateral interest in the ORRI, a finding that I am not 5 making that they do. But the burden under <u>Timbers</u> has to demonstrate that any decline has an adverse effect. And I have zero evidence before me as to what the current value is of this ORRI. It could be worth a billion dollars, for all I know. don't know what it's worth. I have zero evidence on that.

It's the burden of the movant to show me they need adequate protection. And the fact that oil and gas is a depleting asset, you need to say from the beginning what's it depleting, under <u>Timbers</u>. If you have a massively oversecured creditor, for example, then they don't need adequate protection.

I find there's simply a lack of evidence to support the claim. I'm also ruling pretty narrowly today -- this is 18 really hard, and there's no way I'm going to rule from the 19 bench as to whether or not there is a lien, whether it's 20 required to be a mortgage or is a personal property interest on the ORRI without really taking the trouble to go through this. I think it's important. I don't think it's an obvious firstblush call one way or the other. And so I'm, to some extent, 24 cowardly ruling on that absence of evidence and not going into the hard stuff. I think we'll get there at confirmation.

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I, frankly, very much appreciate the preview. 1 2 gives me a lot to work on and think about. But on a narrow 3 basis, everybody agrees what the burden is on a party seeking 4 this, and I find that the evidentiary burden hasn't been met. $5 \parallel$ So I am denying the motion, but I'm denying it without 6 prejudice, and I am not ruling on the actual lien questions one 7 way or the other. 8 Thank y'all. Y'all have continued discussions, I 9 know, about how to handle this, and we'll deal with it at the plan confirmation. We're in adjournment. Thank you. 11 MR. PEREZ: Thank you, Your Honor. 12 MS. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 13 MR. GOODWINE: Thank you, Your Honor. (Proceedings concluded at 11:35 a.m.) 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

CERTIFICATION

I, Alicia Jarrett, court-approved transcriber, hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter, and to the best of my ability.

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ALICIA JARRETT, AAERT NO. 428

DATE: June 1, 2021

ACCESS TRANSCRIPTS, LLC